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Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to
be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to
individual players (agents) and the decentralized nature of this information. When the number of players
is sufficiently large and the interactions among agents is of the mean-field type, one way to overcome this
challenge is to investigate the infinite-population limit of the problem, which leads to a mean-field game. In
this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with infinite-horizon discounted
cost criteria. Using the technique of converting the original partially observed stochastic control problem to
a fully observed one on the belief space and the dynamic programming principle, we establish the existence
of Nash equilibria for these game models under very mild technical conditions. Then, we show that the
mean-field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for
games with sufficiently many agents.
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1. Introduction In this paper, we consider discrete-time mean-field games with decentralized
partial observation under infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criteria. This type of game
models arise as the infinite population limit of finite-agent dynamic games of the mean-field type;
that is, the interactions among agents are modeled by the mean-field term (i.e., the empirical
distribution of their states), which affects both the agents’ individual costs, and their state and
observation transition probabilities. Letting the number of agents go to infinity, the mean-field
term converges to the distribution of a single generic agent. Hence, in the limiting case, a generic
agent is faced with a single-agent stochastic control problem with a constraint on the distribution
of the state at each time (i.e., mean-field game problem). The main goal in this class of problems is
to establish the existence of a policy and a state distribution flow such that when the generic agent
applies this policy, the resulting distribution of agent’s state is same as the state distribution flow.
This last property is called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle (Huang et al. [28]).
The purpose of this paper is to study the existence of such an equilibrium for a general class of
mean-field game models with discounted-cost criteria under decentralized partial observation and
to establish that the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes a nearly Nash equilibrium for
finite-agent games with sufficiently many agents.
Mean-field games have been introduced by Huang et al. [28] and Lasry and Lions [32] around
the same time to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for fully-observed non-
cooperative differential games with a large number of identical agents. The main feature of this
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approach is to reduce the decentralized game problem to a centralized stochastic decision problem
using the NCE principle. The equilibrium solution of this decision problem provides an almost
Nash equilibrium when the number of agents is sufficiently large. Characterization of the solution
entails a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward in time and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
evolving backward in time. We refer the reader to Huang et al. [27], Tembine et al. [41], Huang
[25], Bensoussan et al. [3], Cardaliaguet [10], Carmona and Delarue [11], Gomes and Sau´de [20],
Moon and Bas¸ar [33] for studies of fully-observed continuous-time mean-field games with different
models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games
with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
In the literature relatively few results are available on partially-observed mean-field games. In-
deed, our work appears to be the first one that studies discrete-time mean-field games under
partial observations. Existing works have mostly studied the continuous-time setup, and analyses
of continuous-time and discrete-time setups are quite different. Huang et al. [26] study a partially-
observed continuous-time mean-field game with linear individual dynamics. S¸en and Caines [13, 14]
consider a continuous-time mean-field game with major-minor agents and nonlinear dynamics
where the minor agents can partially observe the state of the major agent. S¸en and Caines [16, 15]
also develop a nonlinear filtering theory for McKean-Vlasov type stochastic differential equations
that arise as the infinite population limit of the partially-observed differential game of the mean-
field type. The nonlinear filtering equation is derived using Itoˆ’s lemma for Banach space valued
stochastic processes. Tang and Meng [40] study a continuous-time partially observed stochastic
control problem of the mean-field type and establish a maximum principle to characterize the
optimal control. Huang and Wang [24] consider a continuous-time mean-field game with linear
individual dynamics where two types of partial information structure are considered: (i) agents
cannot observe the white-noise which is common to all agents, (ii) agents can access the additive
white-noise version of their own states.
The class of discrete-time mean-field games we consider in this paper are defined on a Polish
state space and with infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criteria for the players, who have
access to decentralized partial observation on their individual states. In such games, a generic agent
is faced with a partially observed stochastic control problem under the NCE principle, which, as
indicated earlier, states that the state distribution flow under an optimal decision rule should be
the same as the mean-field term that appears in the state and observation dynamics as well as
in the individual cost functions. In accordance with this, the classical techniques used to study
partially observed optimal control problems are not sufficient to analyze mean-field games. To
establish the existence of an equilibrium solution, we have to bring in the fixed-point approach
that is used to obtain equilibria in classical game problems, along with the technique of converting
partially observed optimal control problems to fully observed ones on the belief space and then
employing the dynamic programming principle. The precise descriptions of the mean-field game
and the finite-agent game problems are given in Sections 3 and 2, respectively. In Section 4 we prove
the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. In Section 5 we establish that the mean-field equilibrium
policy is approximately Nash for finite-agent games with sufficiently many agents. In Section 6 we
illustrate our results by considering an example.
In Saldi et al. [38] (see also the abridged conference version [39]) we solved the fully-observed
version of this problem under a similar set of assumptions on the system components. The tech-
niques used in this paper to establish the existence of a mean field and an approximate Nash
equilibrium are almost the same as in Saldi et al. [38] modulo some transformations of the original
problems into equivalent ones for which we can still use the techniques in Saldi et al. [38]. However,
as a result of these transformations, there are highly non-trivial differences between the proofs in
this paper and in Saldi et al. [38]. For instance, as a result of fully observed reduction of partially
observed optimal control problem in the mean field game, the dependence of the state transition
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probability of the fully observed model on the mean-field term is not explicit as in Saldi et al. [38].
Therefore, it is quite challenging to prove the weak continuity of this transition probability with
respect to the mean-field term, which is a very crucial result in order to establish the existence of
a mean-field equilibrium.
Notation. For a metric space E, we let Cb(E) denote the set of all bounded continuous real
functions on E, and P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on E. For any E-valued
random element x, L(x)( · )∈P(E) denotes the distribution of x. A sequence {µn} of measures on E
is said to converge weakly to a measure µ if
∫
E
g(e)µn(de)→
∫
E
g(e)µ(de) for all g ∈Cb(E). For any
ν ∈P(E) and measurable real function g on E, we define ν(g) := ∫ gdν. For any subset B of E, we
let ∂B and Bc denote the boundary and complement of B, respectively. The notation v∼ ν means
that the random element v has distribution ν. Unless otherwise specified, the term “measurable”
will refer to Borel measurability.
2. Finite Player Game We consider a discrete-time partially observed N -agent stochastic
game of mean-field type with a Polish state space X, a Polish action space A, and a Polish obser-
vation space Y. For every t∈ {0,1,2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}, let xNi (t) ∈ X, aNi (t)∈ A, and
yNi (t)∈Y denote the state, the action, and the observation of Agent i at time t, and let
e
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · )∈P(X)
denote the empirical distribution of the states of agents at time t, where δx ∈ P(X) is the Dirac
measure at x. The initial states xNi (0) are independent and identically distributed according to µ0.
For each t≥ 0, the current-observations (yN1 (t), . . . , yNN (t)) and the next-states (xN1 (t+1), . . . , xNN(t+
1)) of agents are obtained randomly according to the conditional probability laws
N∏
i=1
r
(
dyNi (t)
∣∣xNi (t), e(N)t ),
N∏
i=1
p
(
dxNi (t+1)
∣∣xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t ),
where the stochastic kernel p : X×A×P(X)→P(X) denotes the transition probability law of the
next state given the previous state-action pair and the empirical distribution of states, and the
stochastic kernel r : X×P(X)→P(Y) denotes the transition probability law of the current obser-
vation given the current state and the empirical distribution of states. The measurable function
c :X×A×P(X)→ [0,∞) is the one-stage cost function.
Define the history spaces H0=Y and Ht= (Y×A)t×Y for t= 1,2, . . ., all endowed with product
Borel σ-algebras. A policy for a generic agent is a sequence π= {πt} of stochastic kernels on A given
Ht. The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted by Πi. Let Π˜i be the set of policies in Πi which
only use the observations; that is, π ∈ Π˜i if πt :
∏t
k=0Y→P(A) for each t≥ 0. Let Π(N) =
∏N
i=1Πi
and Π˜(N) =
∏N
i=1 Π˜i. We let pi
(N) := (π1, . . . , πN), πi ∈Πi denote the N -tuple of policies for all the
agents in the game. Under such N -tuple of policies, the actions of agents at each time t ≥ 0 is
obtained randomly according to the conditional probability law
N∏
i=1
πit
(
daNi (t)
∣∣hNi (t)), (2.1)
where hNi (t) = (y
N
i (t), a
N
i (t− 1), yNi (t− 1) . . . , aNi (0), yNi (0)) is the observation-action history ob-
served by Agent i up to time t. Note that agents can only use their local observations. Hence, it is
a partially observed game model.
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For Agent i, the infinite-horizon discounted cost under the initial distribution µ0 and N -tuple of
policies pi(N) ∈Π(N) is given by
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) =Epi
(N)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
,
where Epi
(N)[ · ] denotes expectation with respect to the unique probability law induced by the
above stochastic update rules and the initial state distribution µ0 on the infinite product of state,
observation, and action spaces of all agents.
Definition 2.1. A policy pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . , πN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i= 1, . . . ,N , where pi
(N∗)
−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for the class of games formulated above is known
to be difficult due to (almost) decentralized and noisy nature of the information structure of the
problem. Indeed, even if the number of players is small, it is all but impossible to show even the
existence of approximate Nash equilibria for these types of games. However, when the number
of players is sufficiently large, one way to overcome this challenge is to introduce the infinite-
population limit N →∞ of the game described here. In this limiting case, we can model the
empirical distributions of the state configurations as an exogenous state-measure flow, which should
be consistent with the distribution of a generic agent (i.e., the NCE principle) by the law of large
numbers. Hence, in the limiting case, a generic agent is faced with a mean-field game that will be
introduced in the next section. Then one would expect that if each agent in the finite-agent N game
problem adopts the equilibrium policy in the infinite-population limit, the resulting policy will be
an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N . Therefore, by studying the infinite-
population limit, which is easier to handle, one can obtain approximate Nash equilibrium for the
original finite-agent game problem for which establishing the existence of a true Nash equilibrium
is very difficult.
To that end, we slightly change the definition of Nash equilibrium in this model and adopt the
following solution concept:
Definition 2.2. A policy pi(N∗) ∈ Π˜(N) is a Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Π˜i
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i= 1, . . . ,N , and an ε-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗))≤ inf
pii∈Π˜i
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)+ ε
for each i= 1, . . . ,N .
Note that, according to this definition, the agents can only use their local observations
(yNi (t), . . . , y
N
i (0)) to design their policies. Indeed, in practical applications, agents typically have
access only to their local observations. Collecting all the observations in the entire system is in-
tractable, particularly if the number of agents is large. Consequently, establishing that a mean-field
policy is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the game under the assumption that the agents
have access to full observation variables is not necessary in order to cover practically meaningful
scenarios. It is sufficient to establish the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium for the
game with a local information structure. In addition, in the discrete-time mean field literature,
it is common to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria with local (decentralized)
information structures (see Adlakha et al. [1] Biswas [7]). This is true for continuous-time partially
observed case as well (see N.S¸en and Caines [34]).
In Section 5, we will show that the policy in the infinite-population equilibrium is an ε-Nash
equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) when the number of agents is sufficiently large.
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3. Partially observed mean-field games and mean-field equilibria In this section we
introduce a mean-field game that can be interpreted as the infinite-population limit N →∞ of the
game introduced in the preceding section. This mean-field game model is specified by(
X,A,Y, p, r, c,µ0
)
,
where, as before, X, Y, and A are the Polish state, observation, and action spaces, respectively. The
stochastic kernel p : X× A×P(X)→P(X) denotes the transition probability and r : X×P(X)→
P(Y) denotes the observation kernel. The measurable function c : X× A× P(X)→ [0,∞) is the
one-stage cost function and µ0 is the distribution of the initial state.
Define the history spaces G0=Y and Gt = (Y×A)t×Y for t= 1,2, . . ., all endowed with product
Borel σ-algebras. A policy is a sequence π = {πt} of stochastic kernels on A given Gt. The set of
all policies is denoted by Π. Partially observed mean-field games are not games in the classical
sense. They are indeed single-agent partially observed stochastic control problems whose state
distribution at each time step should satisfy some consistency condition. In other words, we have
a single agent with partial observations and model the overall behavior of (a large population of)
other agents by an exogenous state-measure flow µ := (µt)t≥0 ⊂P(X) with a given initial condition
µ0. This measure flow µ should also be consistent with the state distributions of this single agent
when the agent acts optimally. The precise mathematical description of the problem is given as
follows.
We let M := {µ ∈ P(X)∞ : µ0 is fixed} be the set of all state-measure flows with a given initial
condition µ0. Given any measure flow µ ∈M, the probabilistic evolution of the states, observations,
and actions is as follows
x(0)∼ µ0,
y(t)∼ p( · |x(t), µt), t=0,1, . . .
x(t)∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µt−1), t= 1,2, . . .
a(t)∼ πt( · |g(t)), t= 0,1, . . . ,
where g(t) ∈ Gt is the observation-action history up to time t. According to the Ionescu Tulcea
theorem (see, e.g., Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre [22]), an initial distribution µ0 on X, a policy
π, and a state-measure flow µ define a unique probability measure P pi on (X × Y × A)∞. The
expectation with respect to P pi is denoted by Epi. A policy π∗ ∈Π is said to be optimal for µ if
Jµ(π
∗) = inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π),
where the infinite-horizon discounted cost of policy π with measure flow µ and the discount factor
β ∈ (0,1) is given by
Jµ(π) :=E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(x(t), a(t), µt)
]
Using these definitions, we first define the set-valued mapping
Ψ :M→ 2Π
as Ψ(µ) = {π ∈Π : π is optimal for µ}. Conversely, we define a single-valued mapping
Λ : Π→M
as follows: given π ∈Π, the state-measure flow µ := Λ(π) is constructed recursively as
µt+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x(t), a(t), µt)P pi(da(t)|x(t))µt(dx(t)),
where P pi(da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π and (µτ)0≤τ≤t.
Using Ψ and Λ, we now introduce the notion of an equilibrium for the mean-field game.
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Definition 3.1. A pair (π,µ)∈Π×M is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈Ψ(µ) and µ=Λ(π).
In other words, the policy π is optimal for the state-measure flow µ and µ is consistent with the
state distributions of the agent when it acts optimally via π.
In this section, the main goal is to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To that
end, we impose the assumptions below on the components of the mean-field game model.
Assumption 3.1.
(a) The cost function c is bounded and continuous.
(b) The stochastic kernel p is weakly continuous in (x,a,µ); i.e., for all x, a and µ,
p( · |xk, ak, µk)→ p( · |x,a,µ) weakly when (xk, ak, µk)→ (x,a,µ).
(c) The observation kernel r is continuous in (x,µ) with respect to total variation norm; i.e.,
for all x and µ, r( · |xk, µk)→ r( · |x,µ) in total variation norm when (xk, µk)→ (x,µ).
(d) A is compact and X is locally compact.
(e) There exist a constant α ≥ 0 and a continuous moment function w : X → [0,∞) (see
Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre [22, Definition E.7]) such that
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
∫
X
w(y)p(dy|x,a,µ)≤αw(x). (3.1)
(f) The initial probability measure µ0 satisfies∫
X
w(x)µ0(dx) =:M <∞.
Remark 3.1. We need Assumption 3.1-(c) in order to establish the continuity of the transition
probability (i.e, ηνt ( · |z, a)), that will be introduced in the next section, of the fully-observed re-
duction of the partially observed mean-field game model with respect to the weak topology. If this
continuity condition holds under any other assumption on the observation kernel r (for instance,
under fully observed case; that is, r( · |x,µ) = δx,µ( · )), then all the results in this paper are still
true. 
The main result of this section is the existence of a mean-field equilibrium under Assumption 3.1.
Later we will show that this mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash-equilibrium
for games with sufficiently many agents.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 1, the mean-field game
(
X,A,Y, p, r, c,µ0
)
admits a mean-
field equilibrium (π,µ).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is given Section 4. To establish the existence of an equilibrium,
we use fully observed reduction of partially observed optimal control problems and the dynamic
programming principle in addition to the fixed point approach that is commonly used in classical
game problems.
4. Proof of Theorem 3.1 Note that, given any measure flow µ ∈M, the optimal control
problem for the mean-field game reduces to one of finding an optimal policy for a partially observed
Markov decision process (POMDP). Hence, before starting the proof of Theorem 3.1, we first review
a few relevant results on POMDPs. To this end, fix any µ ∈M and consider the corresponding
optimal control problem.
Let Pw(X) :=
{
µ ∈P(X) : µ(w)<∞}. It is known that any POMDP can be reduced to a (com-
pletely observable) MDP (see Yushkevich [43], Rhenius [37]), whose states are the posterior state
distributions or beliefs of the observer; that is, the state at time t is
z(t) := Pr{x(t)∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t− 1)} ∈ P(X).
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We call this equivalent MDP the belief-state MDP. Note that since L(x(t)) ∈ Pw(X) under any
policy by Assumption 1-(e),(f), we have Pr{x(t) ∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t−1)} ∈ Pw(X) almost
everywhere. Therefore, the belief-state MDP has state space Z=Pw(X) and action space A, where Z
is equipped with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the topology of weak convergence. The transition
probabilities {ηt}t≥0 of the belief-state MDP can be constructed as follows (see also Herna´ndez-
Lerma [21]). Let z denote the generic state variable for the belief-state MDP. Fix any t≥ 0. First
consider the transition probability on X×Y given Z×A
Rt(x∈A,y ∈B|z, a) :=
∫
X
κt(A,B|x′, a)z(dx′),
where κt(dx,dy|x′, a) := r(dy|x,µt+1)⊗ p(dx|x′, a,µt). Let us disintegrate Rt as follows
Rt(dx,dy|z, a) =Ht(dy|z, a)⊗Ft(dx|z, a, y).
Then, we define the mapping Ft : Z×A×Y→ Z as
Ft(z, a, y)( · ) =Ft( · |z, a, y). (4.1)
Note that
Ft(z, a, y)( · ) = Pr{x(t+1)∈ · |z(t) = z, a(t) = a, y(t+1)= y}
and
Ht( · |z, a) = Pr{y(t+1)∈ · |z(t) = z, a(t) = a}.
Then, ηt : Z×A→P(Z) can be written as
ηt( · |z(t), a(t))=
∫
Y
δFt(z(t),a(t),y(t+1))( · ) Ht(dy(t+1)|z(t), a(t)).
The initial point for the belief-state MDP is µ0; that is, L(z(0))∼ δµ0 . Finally, for each t≥ 0, the
one-stage cost function Ct of the belief-state MDP is given by
Ct(z, a) :=
∫
X
c(x,a,µt)z(dx). (4.2)
Hence, the belief-state MDP is a Markov decision process with the components
(
Z,A,{ηt}t≥0,{Ct}t≥0, δµ0
)
.
For the belief-state MDP define the history spaces K0 = Z and Kt = (Z×A)t×Z, t= 1,2, . . .. A
policy is a sequence ϕ= {ϕt} of stochastic kernels on A given Kt. The set of all policies is denoted
by Φ. AMarkov policy is a sequence ϕ= {ϕt} of stochastic kernels on A given Z. The set of Markov
policies is denoted by M. Let J˜(ϕ,µ0) denote the discounted cost function of policy ϕ∈Φ for initial
point µ0 of the belief-state MDP. Notice that any history vector s(t) = (z(0), . . . , z(t), a(0), . . . , a(t−
1)) of the belief-state MDP is a function of the history vector g(t) = (y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t−1))
of the POMDP. Let us write this relation as i(g(t)) = s(t). Hence, for a policy ϕ= {ϕt} ∈ Φ, we
can define a policy πϕ = {πϕt } ∈Π as
π
ϕ
t ( · |g(t)) := ϕt( · |i(g(t))).
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Let us write this as a mapping from Φ to Π: Φ ∋ ϕ 7→ i(ϕ) = πϕ ∈ Π. It is straightforward to
show that the cost functions J˜(ϕ,µ0) and J(π
ϕ, µ0) are the same. One can also prove that (see
Yushkevich [43], Rhenius [37])
inf
ϕ∈Φ
J˜(ϕ,µ0) = inf
pi∈Π
J(π,µ0) (4.3)
and furthermore, that if ϕ is an optimal policy for belief-state MDP, then πϕ is optimal for the
POMDP as well. Therefore, the optimal control problem for the mean-field game is equivalent to
the optimal control of belief-state MDP.
Now, we derive the conditions satisfied by the components of the belief-state MDP under As-
sumption 1. Note first that Z=
⋃
n≥1Kn where Kn := {µ∈Pw(X) : µ(w)≤ n}. Since w is a moment
function, each Kn is tight (Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre [22, Proposition E.8]). Moreover, each
Kn is also closed since w is continuous. Therefore, each Kn is compact with respect to the weak
topology. This implies that Z is a σ-compact Polish space. Define W : Z→R as
W (z) =
∫
X
w(x)z(dx).
Note that W is a moment function on Z. Indeed, we have
lim
n→∞
inf
z∈Kcn
W (z) =∞.
We also have
sup
a∈A
∫
Z
W (z′)ηt(dz
′|z, a)≤ αW (z), for all t≥ 0.
Moreover, by Feinberg et al. [18, Theorem 3.6], ηt is weakly continuous in (z, a) for all t ≥ 0.
Therefore, the belief-state MDP satisfies the following conditions under Assumption 1.
(i) The cost functions {Ct} are bounded and continuous.
(ii) The stochastic kernels {ηt} are weakly continuous.
(iii) A is compact and Z is σ-compact.
(iv) There exist a constant α≥ 0 and a lower semi-continuous moment function W : Z→ [0,∞)
such that
sup
a∈A
∫
Z
W (y)ηt(dy|z, a)≤αW (z), for all t≥ 0.
(v) The initial probability measure δµ0 satisfies
W (δµ0) =:M <∞.
Our approach to prove Theorem 3.1 can be summarized as follows: (i) first, we lift the partially
observed stochastic control problem, that a generic agent is faced with, to a fully observed stochastic
control problem (i.e., belief-state MDP) using the above mentioned results; (ii) we prove that the
state transition probabilities of the belief-state MDP are continuous with respect to state measure
flow of the original partially observed problem, (iii) finally, we use the technique in our paper
Saldi et al. [38], which is developed to show the existence of mean-field equilibria for fully observed
mean-field games, to finish the proof. The key step in our approach is (ii) in which we mimic the
elegant proof technique that is established by Feinberg et al. [18] to prove the weak continuity
of the transition probabilities of fully observed reduction of partially observed stochastic control
problems.
Saldi, Bas¸ar, and Raginsky: Partially Observed Stochastic Games with Mean-Field Interactions
Mathematics of Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 9
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.1. Define the mapping B :P(Z)→P(X) as follows:
B(ν)( · )=
∫
Z
z( · ) ν(dz).
In other words, B(ν) is the so-called ‘barycenter’ of ν, see, e.g., Phelps [36]. Using this definition,
for any ν ∈P(Z×A)∞, we define the measure flow µν ∈P(X)∞ as follows:
µν =
(
B(νt,1)
)
t≥0
,
where for any ν ∈P(Z×A), we let ν1 denote the marginal of ν on Z; that is, ν1( · ) := ν( · ×A). Let
{ηνt }t≥0 and {Cνt }t≥0 be, respectively, the transition probabilities and one-stage cost functions of
belief-state MDP induced by the measure flow µν . We let Jν∗,t : Z→ [0,∞) denote the discounted
cost value function at time t of this belief-state MDP; that is,
Jν∗,t(z) := inf
ϕ∈Φ
Eϕ
[ ∞∑
k=t
βk−tCνk (z(k), a(k))
∣∣∣∣z(t) = z
]
.
Let Jν∗ :=
(
Jν∗,t
)
t≥0
. To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we use the technique in our
previous paper Saldi et al. [38] adopted from Jovanovic and Rosenthal [29], which enables us to
transform the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) characterizing the mean-field equilibrium into a
fixed point equation of a set-valued mapping from the set of state-action measure flows P(Z×A)∞
into itself. Then, using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border [2, Corollary 17.55]),
we deduce the existence of a mean-field equilibrium.
Remark 4.1. We note that the technique used here to prove the existence of a mean-field
equilibrium is very similar to the one in our previous paper Saldi et al. [38], in which we have
studied fully-observed version of the same problem. However, there is a crucial difference in the
details between this problem and the fully-observed one. In the fully-observed case, the transition
probability is given by p( · |x,a,µt) from which we can immediately deduce the continuity of the
transition probability with respect to state-measure flow. However, in the partially-observed case,
we do not have such an explicit analytical expression describing the relation between ηνt and µ
ν
from which we can deduce the same continuity result. Hence, we need to prove this highly non-
trivial statement (unlike the fully-observed case) in order to use the technique in Saldi et al. [38].
Indeed, this is the key step here (step (ii) above) to prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium.
After we prove this result, the rest of the proof follows the same steps as in Saldi et al. [38]. However,
for the sake of completeness, we give the full details of the proof, since we are using quite different
notation as a result of fully-observed reduction of the original problem and the dependence of the
transition probability of the belief-state MDP on the state-measure flow is not explicit as in the
fully-observed case. 
As we mentioned above, we first transform the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) into a fixed
point equation of a set-valued mapping from P(Z × A)∞ into itself. To that end, we define the
product space C := Cβ(Z)∞ in which Jν∗ is an element. Here, Cβ(Z) := {u ∈ Cb(Z) : ‖u‖ ≤ ‖c‖1−β}.
Moreover, we equip C with the following metric:
ρ(u,v) :=
∞∑
t=0
σ−t‖ut− vt‖,
where σ > 0 is chosen so that σβ < 1. For any t ≥ 0, we define the Bellman optimality operator
T νt :Cβ(Z)→Cβ(Z) as
T νt u(z) =min
a∈A
[
Cνt (z, a)+β
∫
Z
u(y)ηνt (dy|z, a)
]
.
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In the MDP theory, T νt gives the relation between value functions J
ν
∗,t and J
ν
∗,t+1. Moreover, given
Jν∗,t+1, it characterizes the optimal policy at time t. It is standard to prove that T
ν
t is a contraction
on Cβ(Z) with modulus β for all t≥ 0, i.e., ‖T νt (u)−T νt (v)‖≤ β‖u− v‖ for all u, v ∈Cβ(Z). Let us
define the operator T ν : C → C as
(
T νu
)
t
= T νt ut+1, for t≥ 0. (4.4)
It can be shown that T ν is a contraction on C with modulus σβ:
ρ(T νu, T νv)≤ σβ · ρ(u,v), ∀u,v ∈ C.
Since (C, ρ) is a complete metric space, T ν has a unique fixed point by the Banach fixed point
theorem.
The following theorem is a known result in the theory of nonhomogeneous Markov decision
processes (see Hinderer [23, Theorems 14.4 and 17.1]). For any given ν, it characterizes Jν∗ and the
optimal policy of the belief-state MDP.
Theorem 4.1. For any ν, the collection of value functions Jν∗ is the unique fixed point of the
operator T ν . Furthermore, ϕ∈M is optimal if and only if
ν
ϕ
t
({
(z, a) :Cνt (z, a)+β
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, a) = T νt Jν∗,t+1(z)
})
=1, (4.5)
where νϕt =L
(
z(t), a(t)
)
under ϕ and ν.
We are now ready to define the above-mentioned set-valued map from P(Z×A)∞ into itself. To
that end, for any ν ∈P(Z×A)∞, let us define the following sets:
C(ν) :=
{
ν ′ ∈P(Z×A)∞ : ν ′0,1 = δµ0 and ν ′t+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da)
}
and
B(ν) :=
{
ν ′ ∈P(Z×A)∞ : ∀t≥ 0,
ν ′t
({
(z, a) :Cνt (z, a)+β
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, a) = T νt Jν∗,t+1(z)
})
= 1
}
.
Note that the set C(ν) characterizes the consistency of the mean-field term with the distribution
of a generic agent, and the set B(ν) characterizes optimality of the policy that is obtained by
disintegrating the state-action measure-flow, for the mean-field term. The set-valued mapping Γ :
P(Z×A)∞→ 2P(Z×A)∞ is given as follows:
Γ(ν) =C(ν)∩B(ν).
We say that ν is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν). The following proposition makes the connection
between mean-field equilibria and the fixed points of Γ, and so, transforms the fixed point equation
π ∈Ψ(Λ(π)) into the fixed point equation ν ∈ Γ(ν).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν = (νt)t≥0. Construct a Markov policy
ϕ= (ϕt)t≥0 for belief-state MDP by disintegrating each νt as νt(dx,da) = νt,1(dx)ϕt(da|x), and let
µ= (B(νt,1))t≥0. Then the pair (π
ϕ,µ) is a mean-field equilibrium.
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Proof. Note that, since ν ∈C(ν), we have νt = L
(
z(t), a(t)
)
(t≥ 0) for belief-state MDP under
the policy ϕ and the measure flow µ. Then, for any f ∈Cb(X), we have
µt+1(f) =B(νt+1,1)(f)
=
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
z′(f)ηνt (dz
′|z, a)νt(dz, da)
=
∫
Z×A
{∫
X
∫
X
f(y)p(dy|x,a,µt)z(dx)
}
νt(dz, da)
=Eϕ
[
lt(z(t), a(t))
] (
here lt(z, a) :=
∫
X
∫
X
f(y)p(dy|x,a,µt)z(dx)
)
=Epi
ϕ
[∫
X
f(y)p(dy|x(t), a(t), µt)
]
. (4.6)
Since (4.6) is true for all f ∈Cb(X), we have
µt+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x(t), a(t), µt)P piϕ(da(t)|x(t))µt(dx(t)),
where P pi
ϕ
(da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under πϕ and
(µτ)0≤τ≤t. Hence, Λ(π
ϕ) =µ.
Since ν ∈ B(ν), the corresponding Markov policy ϕ satisfies (4.5) for ν. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 4.1 and the fact that νt =L
(
z(t), a(t)
)
(t≥ 0) for belief-state MDP under the policy ϕ and the
measure flow µ, ϕ is optimal for belief-state MDP induced by the measure flow µ (or, equivalently,
ν). Therefore, πϕ ∈Ψ(µ). 
By Proposition 4.1, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order to establish the existence
of a mean-field equilibrium. To prove this, Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and
Border [2, Corollary 17.55]), which is a standard result to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium
in classical game problems, is the right tool to use. In order to use Kakutani’s fixed point theorem,
the space on which the set-valued mapping is defined should be convex and compact. However,
the set P(Z × A)∞ in the definition of Γ is not compact. But, we will prove that the image of
P(Z×A)∞ under Γ is contained in a convex and compact subset of P(Z×A)∞. Hence, it is sufficient
to consider this convex and compact set in the definition of Γ. To that end, for each t≥ 0, define
the set
Pt(Z) :=
{
µ∈P(Z) :
∫
Z
W (z)µ(dz)≤ αtM
}
.
Since W is a lower semi-continuous moment function, the set Pt(Z) is compact with respect to the
weak topology, see Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre [22, Proposition E.8, p. 187]. Let us define
Pt(Z×A) := {ν ∈P(Z×A) : ν1 ∈Pt(Z)}.
Since A is compact, Pt(Z×A) is tight. Furthermore, Pt(Z×A) is closed with respect to the weak
topology. Hence, Pt(Z×A) is compact. Let Ξ :=∏∞
t=0Pt(Z×A), which is convex and compact with
respect to the product topology.
Proposition 4.2. We have Γ
(P(Z×A)∞) := {ν ′ : ν ′ ∈ Γ(ν), ν ∈P(Z×A)∞}⊂ Ξ.
Proof. Fix any ν ∈P(Z×A)∞. It is sufficient to prove that C(ν)⊂ Ξ. Let ν ′ ∈C(ν). We prove
by induction that ν ′t,1 ∈Ptv(Z) for all t≥ 0. The claim trivially holds for t=0 as ν ′0,1 = δµ0 . Assume
the claim holds for t and consider t+1. We have∫
Z
W (y)ν ′t+1,1(dy) =
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
W (y)ηνt (dy|z, a)νt(dz, da)
≤
∫
Z
αW (z)νt,1(dz) (by (iv))
≤ αt+1M (as νt,1 ∈Ptv(Z)).
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Hence, ν ′t+1,1 ∈Pt+1v (Z). 
By Proposition 4.2, it is sufficient to prove that Γ has a fixed point ν ∈ Ξ. As in Jovanovic and
Rosenthal [29, Theorem 1], one can prove that C(ν) ∩ B(ν) 6= ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. Moreover, note
that both C(ν) and B(ν) are convex, and thus their intersection is also convex. Ξ is a convex
compact subset of a locally convex topological spaceM(Z×A)∞, whereM(Z×A) denotes the set
of all finite signed measures on Z×A. Hence, in order to deduce the existence of a fixed point of
Γ, we need to prove that it has a closed graph. Before stating this result, we prove the following
proposition which is a key element of the proof as mentioned earlier (i.e., step (ii)). Its proof is
given in Appendix A.
Proposition 4.3. Let ν(n) → ν in product topology. Then, for all t ≥ 0, ην(n)t ( · |z, a) weakly
converges to ηνt ( · |z, a) for all (z, a) ∈ Z×A.
Using Proposition 4.3, we can now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. The graph of Γ, i.e., the set
Gr(Γ) := {(ν,ξ)∈Ξ×Ξ : ξ ∈ Γ(ν)} ,
is closed.
Proof. We note that modulo Proposition 4.3, the proof of the proposition is almost the same as
the proof in Saldi et al. [38, Proposition 3.9] for the full state measurement case. However, for the
sake of completeness, we give the proof here.
Let
{
(ν(n),ξ(n))
}
n≥1
⊂ Ξ × Ξ be such that ξ(n) ∈ Γ(ν(n)) for all n and (ν(n),ξ(n))→ (ν,ξ) as
n→∞ for some (ν,ξ)∈Ξ×Ξ. To prove Gr(Γ) is closed, it is sufficient to prove that ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
Using Proposition 4.3, we first prove that ξ ∈C(ν); that is, for all t≥ 0, we have
ξt+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da).
For all n and t, we have
ξ
(n)
t+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ην
(n)
t ( · |z, a)ν(n)t (dz, da). (4.7)
Since ξ(n)→ ξ in Ξ, ξ(n+1)t+1 → ξt+1 weakly. Let g ∈ Cb(Z). Then, by Langen [31, Theorem 3.5], we
have
lim
n→∞
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
g(z′)ην
(n)
t (dz
′|z, a)ν(n)t (dz, da) =
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
g(z′)ηνt (dz
′|z, a)νt(dx,da)
since ν(n)t → νt weakly and
∫
Z
g(y)ην
(n)
t ( · |z, a) converges to
∫
Z
g(y)ηνt ( · |z, a) continuously1 (see
Langen [31, Theorem 3.5]). This implies that the measure in the right hand side of (4.7) converges
weakly to
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da). Therefore, we have
ξt+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da),
from which we conclude that ξ ∈C(ν).
1 Suppose g, gn (n ≥ 1) are measurable functions on metric space E. The sequence gn is said to converge to g
continuously if limn→∞ gn(en) = g(e) for any en→ e where e ∈ E.
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To complete the proof, it suffices to prove that ξ ∈B(ν). To that end, for each n and t, let us
define the following functions
F
(n)
t (z, a) :=C
ν
(n)
t (z, a)+β
∫
Z
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y)η
ν
(n)
t (dy|z, a)
and
Ft(z, a) :=C
ν
t (z, a)+β
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, a).
By definition,
Jν
(n)
∗,t (z) =min
a∈A
F
(n)
t (z, a) and J
ν
∗,t(z) =min
a∈A
Ft(z, a).
Define also the following sets
A
(n)
t :=
{
(z, a) : F
(n)
t (z, a) = J
ν
(n)
∗,t (z)
}
and
At :=
{
(z, a) : Ft(z, a) = J
ν
∗,t(z)
}
.
Since ξ(n) ∈B(ν(n)), we have
1= ξ
(n)
t
(
A
(n)
t
)
, for all n and t.
To prove to ξ ∈B(ν), we need to show that
1 = ξt
(
At
)
, for all t.
First note that since both F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t are continuous, A
(n)
t is closed. Moreover, At is also
closed as both Ft and J
ν
∗,t are continuous. One can also prove as in Saldi et al. [38, Proposition
3.10] that F
(n)
t converges to Ft continuously and J
ν
(n)
∗,t converges to J
ν
∗,t continuously, as n→∞.
For each M ≥ 1, define the closed set BMt :=
{
(z, a) : Ft(z, a)≥ Jν∗,t(z)+ ǫ(M)
}
, where ǫ(M)→ 0
as M →∞. Since both Ft and Jν∗,t is continuous, we can choose {ǫ(M)}M≥1 so that ξt(∂BMt ) = 0
for each M . Note that by the monotone convergence theorem, we have
ξ
(n)
t
(
Act ∩A(n)t
)
= lim inf
M→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩A(n)t ).
This implies that
1 = limsup
n→∞
lim inf
M→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A(n)t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩A(n)t
)}
≤ lim inf
M→∞
limsup
n→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A(n)t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩A(n)t
)}
.
For any fixed M , we prove that the limit of the second term in the last expression converges to
zero. To that end, we first note that ξ
(n)
t converges weakly to ξt as n→∞ when both measures
are restricted to BMt , as B
M
t is closed and ξt(∂B
M
t ) = 0, see, e.g., Bogachev [8, Theorem 8.2.3].
Furthermore, since F
(n)
t converges to Ft continuously and J
ν
(n)
∗,t converges to J
ν
∗,t continuously,
1
A
(n)
t ∩B
M
t
converges continuously to 0, which implies by Langen [31, Theorem 3.5] that
limsup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩A(n)t
)
= 0.
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Therefore, we obtain
1≤ limsup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A(n)t
)
≤ limsup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t (At)
≤ ξt(At),
where the last inequality follows from the Portmanteau theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley [6, Theorem
2.1]) and the fact that At is closed. Hence, ξt(At) = 1. Since t is arbitrary, this is true for all t. This
means that ξ ∈B(ν). Therefore, ξ ∈ Γ(ν). 
Recall that Ξ is a compact convex subset of the locally convex topological space M(Z× A)∞.
Furthermore, the graph of Γ is closed by Proposition 4.4, and it takes nonempty convex values.
Therefore, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border [2, Corollary 17.55]), Γ has a
fixed point. Therefore, the pair (πϕ,µ) is a mean field equilibrium, where πϕ and µ are constructed
as in the statement of Proposition 4.1. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
5. Approximation of Nash Equilibria In this section, our aim is to show that the policy
generated by the mean-field equilibrium, when adopted by each agent, is nearly Nash equilibrium
for games with sufficiently large number of agents. Let (π′,µ) denote the pair in the mean-field
equilibrium. In addition to Assumption 3.1, we impose an additional assumption, which is stated
below. To this end, let dBL denote the bounded Lipschitz metric (see, e.g., Dudley [17, Proposition
11.3.2]) on P(X) that metrizes the weak topology, and define the following moduli of continuity:
ωp(r) := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
‖p( · |x,a,µ)− p( · |x,a, ν)‖TV
ωc(r) := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
|c(x,a,µ)− c(x,a, ν)|.
Assumption 5.1.
(a) ωp(r)→ 0 and ωc(r)→ 0 as r→ 0.
(b) For each t ≥ 0, π′t : Gt → P(A) is deterministic; that is, π′t( · |g(t)) = δft(g(t))( · ) for some
measurable function ft :Gt→A, and weakly continuous.
(c) The observation kernel r( · |x) does not depend on the mean-field term.
Remark 5.1. Note that, if the state transition probability p is independent of the mean-field
term, then Assumption 5.1-(a) for ωp is always true. Indeed, in that case, we have ωp(r) = 0 for all
r. 
Remark 5.2. One way to establish Assumption 5.1-(b) is as follows. Suppose that, for µ, there
exists a unique minimizer az ∈A of
Cµt (z, · )+β
∫
Z
Jµ∗,t+1(z
′)ηµt (dz
′|z, · ) =:Rt(z, · ), (5.1)
for each z ∈ Z and for all t ≥ 0. In addition, suppose that Ft : Z × A× Y→ Z (t ≥ 0) in (4.1) is
continuous. Note that uniqueness conditions analogous to (5.1) are quite common in mean field
literature (see, e.g., Gomes et al. [19, Assuption 4], S¸en and Caines [16, Assumption A5], Huang
et al. [28, Assumption H5], N.S¸en and Caines [34, Assumption A9]).
Under the condition of unique minimizer to (5.1), one can prove that the policy ϕ in Proposi-
tion 4.1 is deterministic and weakly continuous (see Saldi et al. [38, Section 5]). Indeed, fix any
t≥ 0 and consider the policy ϕt at time t in ϕ. By (5.1), we must have ϕt( · |z) = δft(z)( · ) for some
ft : Z→A which minimizes Rt(z, · ) of the above form; that is, mina∈ARt(z, a) =Rt(z, ft(z)) for all
z ∈ Z. If ft is continuous, then ϕt is also continuous. Hence, in order to prove the assertion, it is
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sufficient to prove that ft is continuous. Suppose zn→ z in Z. Note that lt( · ) =mina∈ARt( · , a) is
continuous. Therefore, every accumulation point of the sequence {ft(zn)}n≥1 must be a minimizer
for Rt(z, · ). Since there exists a unique minimizer ft(z) of Rt(z, · ), the set of all accumulation
points of {ft(zn)}n≥1 must be {ft(z)}. This implies that ft(zn) converges to ft(z) since A is compact.
Hence, ft is continuous.
Recall that the mean-field equilibrium policy is given by
πt( · |g(t)) =ϕt( · |i(g(t))).
Hence, π is also a deterministic policy as i is a deterministic function. The function i can be given
recursively by Ft : Z×A×Y→ Z (t≥ 0) in (4.1) and the policy ϕ. Since Ft is continuous for all t
and ϕ is also weakly continuous, we can conclude that the mean-field policy π is deterministic and
weakly continuous. Hence, Assumption 5.1-(b) holds.
For instance, we can prove existence of a unique minimizer to (5.1) and the continuity of Ft
for all t ≥ 0 under the following conditions on the system components. Suppose that X = Rd,
Y = Rp, and A ⊂ Rm is convex. In addition, suppose that p(dx′|x,a,µ) = ̺(x′|x,a,µ)m(dx′) and
r(dy|x) = ζ(y|x)m(dy), where m denotes the Lebesgue measure. Assume that both ̺ and ζ are
continuous and bounded, and ̺ and c are strictly convex in a. Then we have
Ht(dy|z, a) = ht(y|z, a)m(dy),
where ht(y|z, a) is given by
ht(y|z, a) =
∫
X
∫
X
ζ(y|x)̺(x|x′, a,µt)m(dx)z(dx′).
Similarly, we have
Ft(dx|z, a, y) = ft(dx|z, a, y)m(dx),
where ft(x|z, a, y) is given by
ft(x|z, a, y) =
∫
X
ζ(y|x)̺(x|x′, a,µt)z(dx′)∫
X
∫
X
ζ(y|x)̺(x|x′, a,µt)m(dx)z(dx′)
=
∫
X
ζ(y|x)̺(x|x′, a,µt)z(dx′)
ht(y|z, a) .
One can prove that ft is continuous. Hence, Ft is also continuous by [5, Theorem 16.2]. To show
uniqueness of a minimizer to (5.1), note that
Jµ∗,t+1(z) := inf
ϕ∈Φ
Eϕ
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
βk−t−1Cµk (z(k), a(k))
∣∣∣∣z(t+1)= z
]
= inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
βk−t−1c(x(k), a(k), µk)
∣∣∣∣x(t+1)∼ z
]
=
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)z(dx),
where
V∗,t+1(x) := inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
βk−t−1c(x(k), a(k), µk)
∣∣∣∣x(t+1)= x
]
.
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Hence, for any a∈A, (5.1) can be written as∫
X
c(x,a,µt)z(dx)+β
∫
Y
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)Ft(z, a, y)(dx)Ht(dy|z, a)
=
∫
X
c(x,a,µt)z(dx)+β
∫
Y
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)ft(x|z, a, y)ht(y|z, a)m(dx)m(dy)
=
∫
X
c(x,a,µt)z(dx)+β
∫
Y
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)
(∫
X
ζ(y|x)̺(x|x′, a,µt)z(dx′)
)
m(dx)m(dy)
=
∫
X
c(x,a,µt)z(dx)+β
∫
X
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)̺(x|x′, a,µt)m(dx)z(dx′).
Since c and ̺ are strictly convex in a, the last expression is also strictly convex in a. Hence, there
exists a unique minimizer az ∈A for (5.1). 
For t≥ 0, let Yt+1 :=∏t
k=0Y. Then, for each t≥ 1, define f˜t :Yt+1→A as
f˜t(y(t), . . . , y(0)) := ft
(
y(t), . . . , y(0), f˜t−1(y(t− 1), . . . , y(0)), . . . , f˜0(y(0))
)
,
where f˜0 = f0. Let πt( · |y(t), . . . , y(0)) = δf˜t(y(t),...,y(0))( · ). Note that πt is a weakly continuous
stochastic kernel on A given Yt+1. Indeed, π and π′ are equivalent because, for all t≥ 0, we have
P pi
′(
a(t)∈ · |g(t))= P pi′(a(t)∈ · |y(t), . . . , y(0))
= P pi
(
a(t)∈ · |y(t), . . . , y(0)).
Hence, (π,µ) is also a mean-field equilibrium. In the sequel, we use (π,µ) to prove the approxima-
tion result. The reason for passing from ft to f˜t is that the latter policy becomes Markov in the
equivalent game model that will be introduced in the proof of Theorem 5.2. Thus, we can use the
proof technique in our previous paper (Saldi et al. [38]) to show the existence of an approximate
Nash equilibrium.
Before stating and proving the main result of this section on approximate Nash equilibrium
property of the mean field equilibrium for the finite population case (Theorem 5.2), we discuss
(and establish under some conditions) the uniqueness of the mean-field equilibrium. This entails a
monotonicity condition similar to the monotonicity condition introduced by Lasry and Lions [32].
Assumption 5.2.
(U1) Uniqueness condition in (5.1) holds for any mean-field equilibrium.
(U2) The state transition probability p and the observation kernel r do not depend on the mean-
field term.
(U3) For any ν and µ in Ξ, we have the following monotonicity condition:
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫
Z×A
(
Cµt (z(t), a(t))−Cνt (z(t), a(t))
)
d
(
µt− νt
)
(z(t), a(t))≥ 0. (5.2)
We note that Assumption 5.2 is exactly the discrete-time counterpart of the Assumption (U)
introduced in Lacker [30], Carmona and Lacker [12]. Recall that Assumption 5.2-(U1) is true under
the strict convexity assumptions introduced in Remark 5.2.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumption 5.2, there exists at most one solution of the mean-field equi-
librium. Furthermore, if Assumption 3.1 holds, then there exists a unique mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that (πµ,µ) and (πν ,ν) are two distinct mean-field equilibria. Note that, under
Assumption 5.2-(U1), the policies in mean-field equilibria are deterministic; that is, πµ = {fµt } and
πν = {fνt }, and they are unique optimal deterministic control policies given the measure flows µ
and ν. In addition, by Assumption 5.2-(U2), the transition probability η in fully-observed reduction
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of the POMDP in mean-field equilibrium does not depend on the mean-field term. Hence, by
Assumption 5.2-(U3), we have the following inequality
Jµ(π
µ)+Jν(π
ν)≥ Jµ(πν)+Jν(πµ).
Since Jµ(π
µ) = infpi Jµ(π) and Jν(π
ν) = infpi Jν(π), we have
Jµ(π
µ) = Jµ(π
ν)
and
Jν(π
ν) = Jν(π
µ).
Recall that πµ and πν are unique optimal deterministic control policies given the measure flows
µ and ν. Therefore, πµ = πν , and so, ν = µ since the transition probability η in fully-observed
problem does not depend on mean-field term. This completes the proof. 
The following theorem is the main result of this section, which states that the policy pi(N) =
(π, . . . , π), where π is repeated N times, is an ε-Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large N .
Theorem 5.2. For any ε > 0, there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥N(ε), the policy pi(N) is an
ε-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 Note that the policy π in the mean-field equilibrium is not necessarily
Markovian, which makes the joint process of the state, observation, and mean-field term non-
Markov. To prove Theorem 5.2, we will first construct an equivalent game model whose states are
the state of the original model plus the current and past observations. In this new model, the mean-
field equilibrium policy automatically becomes Markov. Then, we will use the proof technique in
our previous paper Saldi et al. [38] to show the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium.
This new game model is specified by(
{St}t≥0,A,{Pt}t≥0,{Ct}t≥0, λ0
)
,
where, for each t≥ 0,
St =X×Y× . . .×Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+1-times
and A are the Polish state and action spaces at time t, respectively. The stochastic kernel Pt :
St×A×P(St)→P(St+1) is defined as:
Pt
(
Bt+1×Dt+1× . . .×D0
∣∣s(t), a(t),∆t)
:=
∫
Bt+1
r(Dt+1|x(t+1))
t∏
k=0
1Dk(y(k))p(dx(t+1)|x(t), a(t),∆t,1),
where Bt+1 ∈B(X), Dk ∈B(Y) (k=0, . . . , t+1), s(t) = (x(t), y(t), y(t−1), . . . , y(0)), and ∆t,1 is the
marginal of ∆t on X. Indeed, Pt is the controlled transition probability of next state-observation
pair, current observation, and past observations
(
x(t+1), y(t+1), y(t), . . . , y(0)
)
given the current
state-observation pair and past observations
(
x(t), y(t), y(t−1), . . . , y(0)) in the original mean-field
game. For each t≥ 0, the one-stage cost function Ct : St×A×P(St)→ [0,∞) is defined as:
Ct(s(t), a(t),∆t) := c(x(t), a(t),∆t,1).
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Finally, the initial measure λ0 is given by λ0(ds(0)) := r(dy|x)µ0(dx), where s(0) = (x, y).
Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1 hold. For each t≥ 0, let dt denote the bounded Lipschitz
metric on P(St)2, and define the following moduli of continuity:
ωPt(r) := sup
(s,a)∈St×A
sup
∆,∆′:
dt(∆,∆
′)≤r
‖Pt( · |s, a,∆)−Pt( · |s, a,∆′)‖TV
ωCt(r) := sup
(s,a)∈St×A
sup
∆,∆′:
dt(∆,∆
′)≤r
|Ct(s, a,∆)−Ct(s, a,∆′)|.
Then, for each t≥ 0, the following are satisfied:
(I) The one-stage cost function Ct is bounded and continuous.
(II) The stochastic kernel Pt is weakly continuous.
(III) ωPt(r)→ 0 and ωCt(r)→ 0 as r→ 0.
It is straightforward to prove that (I) and (II) hold since c is continuous, p is weakly continuous,
and r is continuous in total variation norm. For (III), for each t ≥ 0, fix any (s, a) ∈ St × A and
(∆,∆′) ∈ P(St) × P(St), and for any f : St+1 → R, define f˜( · , · ) = f( · , · , y(t), . . . , y(0)) where
s= (x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)). Then, we have
sup
‖f‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
St+1
f(s′)Pt(ds
′|s, a,∆)−
∫
St+1
f(s′)Pt(ds
′|s, a,∆′)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
‖f‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×Y
f˜(x′(t+1), y′(t+1))r(dy′(t+1)|x′(t+1))p(dx′(t+1)|x(t), a,∆1)
−
∫
X×Y
f˜(x′(t+1), y′(t+1))r(dy′(t+1)|x′(t+1))p(dx′(t+1)|x(t), a,∆′1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
‖g‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(x′)p(dx′|x(t), a,∆1)−
∫
X
g(x′)p(dx′|x(t), a,∆′1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ ωp(dBL(∆1,∆′1)).
Since (s, a) ∈ St × A is arbitrary and dBL(∆1,∆′1) ≤ dt(∆,∆′), we have ωPt(r)→ 0 as r→ 0 by
Assumption 5.1-(a). Similarly, we can also prove that ωCt(r)→ 0 as r→ 0.
Recall the set of policies Π in the original mean-field game. Let Π˜ be the set of policies in Π
which only use the observations; that is, π ∈ Π˜ if πt :Yt+1→P(A) for each t≥ 0. Note that Π˜ is a
subset of the set of Markov policies in the new model. For any measure flow ∆= (∆t)t≥0, where
∆t ∈P(St), we denote by Jˆ∆(π) the infinite-horizon discounted-cost of the policy π ∈ Π˜ in this new
model.
Similar to Section 2, we also define the corresponding N agent game as follows. We have the
Polish state spaces {St}t≥0 and action space A. For every t∈ {0,1,2, . . .} and every i∈ {1,2, . . . ,N},
let sNi (t)∈ St and aNi (t)∈A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and let
∆(N)t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δsN
i
(t)( · )∈P(St)
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t. The initial states sNi (0)
are independent and identically distributed according to λ0, and, for each t ≥ 0, the next-state
configuration (sN1 (t+1), . . . , s
N
N(t+1)) is generated at random according to the probability laws
N∏
i=1
Pt
(
dsNi (t+1)
∣∣sNi (t), aNi (t),∆(N)t ).
2 The product metric on St is assumed to be the sum of the metrics of the components in the product space.
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Recall that Π˜i denotes the set of policies that only use local observations for Agent i in the
original game. Note that Π˜i is an admissible class of policies for the new model. Indeed, policies
in Π˜i are Markov for this new model since they partly use the state information. We let Π˜
c
i denote
the set of all policies in Π˜i for Agent i that are weakly continuous; that is, π= {πt} ∈ Π˜ci if for all
t≥ 0, πt : Yt+1→P(A) is continuous when P(A) is endowed with the weak topology.
For Agent i, the infinite-horizon discounted cost under the initial distribution λ0 and N -tuple of
policies pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N) is denoted as Jˆ (N)i (pi(N)).
The following proposition makes the connection between this new model and the original model.
Proposition 5.1. For any N ≥ 1, pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N), and i=1, . . . ,N , we have Jˆi(pi(N)) = Ji(pi(N)).
Similarly, for any π ∈ Π˜ and measure flow ∆, we have Jˆ∆(π) = Jµ(π) where µ= (∆t,1)t≥0.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix B. 
By Proposition 5.1, in the remainder of this section we consider the new game model in place
of the original one. Then, we use the same technique as in our previous paper Saldi et al. [38] to
prove the approximation result since the policy in the mean-field equilibrium is Markov for this
new model. However, as the state space in this new model is expanding at each time step, there
will be some differences between the current proof and the proof in Saldi et al. [38, Section 4].
Therefore, for the sake of completeness, we give the full details of the proof.
Define the measure flow ∆ = (∆t)t≥0 as follows: ∆t = L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)), where
L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) denotes the probability law of (x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) in the original mean-field
game under the policy π in the mean-field equilibrium. For each t≥ 0, define the stochastic kernel
P pit ( · |s,∆) on St+1 given St×P(St) as
P pit ( · |s,∆) :=
∫
A
Pt( · |s, a,∆)πt(da|s).
Since πt is assumed to be weakly continuous, P
pi
t ( · |s,∆) is also weakly continuous in (s,∆). In the
sequel, to ease the notation, we will also write P pit ( · |s,∆) as P pit,∆( · |s).
Lemma 5.1. Measure flow ∆ satisfies
∆t+1( · ) =
∫
St
P pit ( · |s,∆t)∆t(ds)
=∆tP
pi
t,∆t
( · ).
Proof. The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix C. 
For each N ≥ 1, let {sNi (t)}1≤i≤N denote the state configuration at time t in the N -person game
under the policy pi(N)= {π,π, . . . , π}. Define the empirical distribution
∆
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δsN
i
(t)( · ).
Proposition 5.2. For all t≥ 0, we have
L(∆(N)t )→ δ∆t
weakly in P(P(St)), as N →∞.
Proof. It is known that weak topology on P(St) can be metrized using the following metric:
ρ(µ,ν) :=
∞∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|µ(fm)− ν(fm)|,
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where {fm}m≥1 is an appropriate sequence of real continuous and bounded functions on St such
that ‖fm‖ ≤ 1 for all m≥ 1 (see Parthasarathy [35, Theorem 6.6, p. 47]). Define the Wasserstein
distance of order 1 on the set of probability measures P(P(St)) as follows (see Villani [42, Definition
6.1]):
W1(Φ,Ψ) := inf
{
E[ρ(X,Y )] :L(X) =Φ and L(Y ) =Ψ}.
Note that since δ∆t is a Dirac measure, we have
W1(L(∆(N)t ), δ∆t) =
{
E[ρ(X,Y )] :L(X) =L(∆(N)t ) and L(Y ) = δ∆t
}
=E
[ ∞∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|∆(N)t (fm)−∆t(fm)|
]
.
Since convergence in W1 distance implies weak convergence (see Villani [42, Theorem 6.9]), it
suffices to prove that
lim
N→∞
E
[|∆(N)t (f)−∆t(f)|]= 0
for any f ∈Cb(St) and for all t. We prove this by induction on t.
As {sNi (0)}1≤i≤N ∼ λ⊗N0 , the claim is true for t= 0. We suppose that the claim holds for t and
consider t+1. Fix any g ∈Cb(St+1). Then, we have
|∆(N)t+1(g)−∆t+1(g)| ≤ |∆(N)t+1(g)−∆(N)t P pit,∆(N)t (g)|+ |∆
(N)
t P
pi
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)−∆tP pit,∆t(g)|. (5.3)
We first prove that the expectation of the second term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (5.3)
converges to 0 as N →∞. To that end, define F :P(St)→R as
F (∆) =∆P pit,∆(g) :=
∫
St
∫
St+1
g(s′)P pit (ds
′|s,∆)∆(ds).
One can prove that F ∈Cb(P(St)). Indeed, suppose that ∆n converges to ∆. Let us define
ln(s) =
∫
St+1
g(s′)P pit (ds
′|s,∆n)
and
l(s) =
∫
St+1
g(s′)P pit (ds
′|s,∆).
Since P pit is weakly continuous, one can prove that ln converges to l continuously; that is, if sn
converges to s, then ln(sn)→ l(s). By Langen [31, Theorem 3.5], we have F (∆n)→ F (∆), and so,
F ∈Cb(P(St)). This implies that the expectation of the second term on the RHS of (5.3) converges
to zero as L(∆(N)t )→∆t weakly, by the induction hypothesis.
Now, let us write the expectation of the first term on the RHS of (5.3) as
E
[
E
[
|∆(N)t+1(g)−∆(N)t P pit,∆(N)t (g)|
∣∣∣∣sN1 (t), . . . , sNN(t)
]]
.
Then, by Budhiraja and Majumder [9, Lemma A.2], we have
E
[
|∆(N)t+1(g)−∆(N)t P pit,∆(N)t (g)|
∣∣∣∣sN1 (t), . . . , sNN(t)
]
≤ 2 ‖g‖√
N
.
Therefore, the expectation of the first term on the RHS of (5.3) also converges to zero as N →∞.
Since g is arbitrary, this completes the proof. 
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Proposition 5.2 essentially says that in the infinite-population limit, the empirical distribution
of the states under the mean-field policy converges to the deterministic measure flow ∆. Since the
transition probabilities Pt( · |s, a,∆) are continuous in ∆, the evolution of the state of a generic
agent in the finite-agent game with sufficiently many agents and the evolution of the state in the
mean-field game under policies pi(N) = (π, . . . , π) and π, respectively, should therefore be close.
Hence, the distributions of the states in each problem should also be close, from which we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 5.3. We have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (pi
(N)) = Jˆ∆(π) = inf
pi′∈Π
Jˆ∆(π
′).
Proof. For each t≥ 0, let us define
Cpit(s,∆) :=
∫
A
Ct(s, a,∆)πt(da|s).
Since for any permutation σ of {1, . . . ,N} we have
L(sN1 (t), . . . , sNN(t),∆(N)t )=L(sNσ(1)(t), . . . , sNσ(N)(t),∆(N)t ),
the cost function at time t can be written as
E
[
Ct(s
N
1 (t), a
N
1 (t),∆
(N)
t )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
Ct(s
N
i (t), a
N
i (t),∆
(N)
t )
]
=E
[
∆(N)t
(
Cpit(s,∆
(N)
t )
)]
.
Let F :P(St)→R be defined as
F (∆) :=
∫
St
Cpit(s,∆)∆(ds).
One can show that F ∈Cb(P(St)) as πt is weakly continuous. Hence, by Proposition 5.2 we obtain
lim
N→∞
E
[
Ct(s
N
1 (t), a
N
1 (t),∆
(N)
t )
]
= lim
N→∞
E
[
∆
(N)
t
(
Cpit(s,∆
(N)
t )
)]
= lim
N→∞
E[F (∆
(N)
t )]
= F (∆t)
=∆t(Cpit( · ,∆t)). (5.4)
Note that by Lemma 5.1, the discounted cost in the mean-field game can be written as
Jˆ∆(π) =
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t(Cpit( · ,∆t)).
Therefore, by (5.4) and the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (pi
(N)) = Jˆ∆(π),
which completes the proof. 
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In order to prove the approximation result, we have to prove that if the policy of some agent
deviates from the mean-field equilibrium policy, then the corresponding cost of this agent should
be close to the cost in the mean-field limit as in Proposition 5.3, for N sufficiently large. However,
note that this agent can choose different policies for each N in place of the mean-field equilibrium
policy. Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents
in the game model, it is sufficient to change the policy of Agent 1 for each N . To that end, let
{π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Π˜c1 be an arbitrary sequence of policies for Agent 1; that is, for each N ≥ 1 and t≥ 0,
π˜
(N)
t : Y
t+1 →P(A) is weakly continuous. For each N ≥ 1, let {s˜Ni (t)}1≤i≤N be the collection of
states in the N -person game under the policy p˜i(N) := {π˜(N), π, . . . , π}. Define
∆˜
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ
s˜
(N)
i
(t)
( · ).
The following result states that, in the infinite-population limit, the law of the empirical distribution
of the states at each time t is insensitive to local deviations from the mean-field equilibrium policy.
Proposition 5.4. For all t≥ 0, we have
L(∆˜(N)t )→ δ∆t
weakly P(P(St)), as N →∞.
Proof. The proof can be done by slightly modifying the proof of Proposition 5.2, and therefore
will not be included here. See the proof of Saldi et al. [38, Proposition 4.6]. 
For each N ≥ 1, let {sˆN(t)}t≥0 denote the state trajectory of the mean-field game under policy
π˜(N); that is, sˆN(t) evolves as follows:
sˆN(0)∼ λ0 and sˆN(t+1)∼P p˜i(N)t,∆t ( · |sˆN(t)).
Recall that the cost function of this mean-field game is given by
Jˆ∆(π˜
(N)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
Ct(sˆ
N(t), aˆN(t),∆t)
]
, (5.5)
where the action configuration at each time t≥ 0 is generated according to the probability law
π˜
(N)
t (daˆ
N(t)|sˆN(t)) = π˜(N)t (daˆN(t)|yˆN(t), . . . , yˆN(0)).
Proposition 5.5. For any t≥ 0, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN)−L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(TN)∣∣= 0
for any sequence {TN} ⊂Cb(St×P(St)) such that the family
{
TN (s, · ) : s∈ St,N ≥ 1)
}
is equicon-
tinuous and supN≥1 ‖TN‖<∞.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5.5 is given in Appendix D. 
Using Proposition 5.5, we now prove the following theorem which is a key element in the proof
of Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.3. Let {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Π˜c1 be an arbitrary sequence of policies for Agent 1. Then, we
have
lim
N→∞
∣∣Jˆ (N)1 (π˜(N), π, . . . , π)− Jˆ∆(π˜(N))∣∣=0,
where Jˆ∆(π˜
(N)) is given in (5.5).
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Proof. Fix any t≥ 0 and define
TN,t(s,∆) :=
∫
A
Ct(s, a,∆)π˜
(N)
t (da|s).
We first prove that
{
TN,t(s, · ) : s ∈ St,N ≥ 1
}
satisfies the hypothesis in Proposition 5.5. For
equicontinuity, note that for any s∈ St and for any (∆,∆′)∈P(St)2, we have
∣∣TN,t(s,∆)−TN,t(s,∆′)∣∣=
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
Ct(s, a,∆)π˜
(N)
t (da|s)−
∫
A
Ct(s, a,∆
′)π˜
(N)
t (da|s)
∣∣∣∣
≤ ωCt(dt(∆,∆′)).
Since ωCt(r)→ 0 as r → 0, the family
{
TN,t(s, · ) : s ∈ St,N ≥ 1
}
is equicontinuous. Moreover,
supN≥1 ‖TN,t‖<∞.
Therefore, by Proposition 5.5, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣E[Ct(s˜N1 , a˜N1 , ∆˜(N)t )]−E[Ct(sˆN1 , aˆN1 ,∆t)]
∣∣∣∣= 0.
Since t is arbitrary, the above result holds for all t≥ 0. Then the theorem follows from the dominated
convergence theorem. 
As a corollary of Propositions 5.1 and 5.3, and Theorem 5.3, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5.1. We have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π)≥ inf
pi′∈Π˜
Jˆ∆(π
′)
= Jˆ∆(π)
= lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π,π, . . . , π).
Now, we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 One can prove that for any policy pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N), we have
inf
pii∈Π˜i
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i) = inf
pii∈Π˜c
i
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . ,N (see the proof of Saldi et al. [38, Theorem 2.3]). Hence, it is sufficient to
consider weakly continuous policies in Π(N) to establish the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in the
new model.
We first prove that for sufficiently large N , we have
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N))≤ inf
pii∈Π˜c
i
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i)+ ε (5.6)
for each i= 1, . . . ,N . As indicated earlier, since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost
functions are the same for all agents in the new game, it is sufficient to prove (5.6) for Agent 1
only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π˜(N) ∈ Π˜c1 be such that
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π)< inf
pi′∈Π˜c1
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π
′, π, . . . , π)+
ε
3
.
Then, by Corollary 5.1, we have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π) = lim
N→∞
Jˆ∆(π˜
(N))
≥ inf
pi′
Jˆ∆(π
′)
= Jˆ∆(π)
= lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π,π, . . . , π).
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Therefore, there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥N(ε), we have
inf
pi′∈Π˜c1
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π
′, π, . . . , π)+ ε > Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π)+
2ε
3
≥ Jˆ∆(π)+ ε
3
≥ Jˆ (N)1 (π,π, . . . , π).
The result then follows from Proposition 5.1. 
Remark 5.3. We note that, using similar ideas, the finite-horizon cost criterion
E
[ T∑
t=0
c(x(t), a(t), µt)
]
for some T <∞, (5.7)
can be handled with the same quantitative results. The only part that requires a verification
different from the infinite-horizon case is the following result: F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t converge continuously
to Ft and J
ν
∗,t, respectively. Note that, in the finite-horizon case, for each n and t < T , these
functions are given by
F
(n)
t (z, a) =C
ν
(n)
t (z, a)+
∫
Z
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y)η
ν
(n)
(dy|z, a),
Ft(z, a) =C
ν
t (z, a)+
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν(dy|z, a),
and
Jν
(n)
∗,t (z) =min
a∈A
F
(n)
t (z, a) and J
ν
∗,t(z) =min
a∈A
Ft(z, a).
Note that the discount factor β is missing in the above equations. For t= T , we have F (n)T (z, a) =
Cν
(n)
T (z, a) and FT (z, a) = C
ν
T (z, a). Since c is continuous and ν
(n)
T,1 weakly converges to νT,1, we
have that Jν
(n)
∗,T continuously converges to J
ν
∗,T by Bertsekas and Shreve [4, Proposition 7.32]. But
this implies that F
(n)
T−1 continuously converges to FT−1, and so, J
ν
(n)
∗,T−1 continuously converges to
Jν∗,T−1 again by Bertsekas and Shreve [4, Proposition 7.32]. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
we can conclude that F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t continuously converge to Ft and J
ν
∗,t, respectively, for each
t≤ T . Therefore, Theorems 3.1 and 5.2 hold for the finite-horizon cost criterion under the same
assumptions. Furthermore, if we start the mean-field game at time τ > 0 with initial measure
µτ , then the pair
({πt}τ≤t≤T ,{µt}τ≤t≤T ) in Theorem 3.1 is still a mean-field equilibrium for the
sub-game. 
6. An Example In this section, we consider a specific additive noise model to illustrate our
results. In this model, the state and observation dynamics of a generic agent for the mean-field
game are given respectively by
x(t+1)=
∫
X
f(x(t), a(t), x)µt(dx)+ g(x(t), a(t))w(t)
=: F (x(t), a(t), µt)+ g(x(t), a(t))w(t)
and
y(t) =
∫
X
h(x(t), x)µt(dx)+ v(t)
=:H(x(t), µt)+ v(t),
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where x(t)∈X, y(t)∈Y, a(t)∈A, w(t)∈W, and v(t)∈V. Here, we assume that X=Y=W=V=R,
A⊂R, and {w(t)} and {v(t)} are sequences of i.i.d. standard normal random variables independent
of each other. The one-stage cost function of a generic agent is given by
c(x(t), a(t), µt) =
∫
X
d(x(t), a(t), x) µt(dx),
for some measurable function d :X×A×X→ [0,∞).
This model is the infinite-population limit of the N -agent game model with state and observation
dynamics
xNi (t+1)=
1
N
N∑
j=1
f(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), x
N
j (t))+ g(x
N
i (t), a
N
i (t))w
N
i (t)
yNi (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
h(xNi (t), x
N
j (t))+ v
N
i (t)
and the one-stage cost function
c(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t ) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
d(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), x
N
j (t)).
For this model, Assumption 3.1 holds with w(x) = 1+ x2 and α=max{1+ ‖f‖2,L} under the
following conditions: (i) A is compact, (ii) d is continuous and bounded, (iii) g is continuous, and
f is bounded and continuous, (iv) supa∈A g
2(x,a) ≤ Lx2 for some L > 0, (v) h is continuous and
bounded. Note that ‖f‖ is defined as
‖f‖ := sup
(x,a,x′)∈X×A×X
|f(x,a,x′)|.
Indeed, we have∫
X
(1+ y2)p(dy|x,a,µ) =
∫
X
(
1+
[
F (x,a,µ)+ g(x,a)y
]2)
q(y)m(dy)
≤ 1+ ‖f‖2+ g2(x,a)≤ α(1+x2),
where q is the standard normal density and m is the Lebesgue measure. Hence, Assumption 3.1-(e)
holds. In order to verify Assumption 3.1-(b), suppose (xn, an, µn)→ (x,a,µ) and let g ∈ Cb(X).
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|xn, an, µn) = lim
n→∞
∫
X
g
(
F (xn, an, µn)+ g(xn, an)z
)
q(z)m(dz)
=
∫
X
g
(
F (x,a,µ)+ g(x,a)z
)
q(z)m(dz)
since g and F are continuous, where the continuity of F follows from Langen [31, Theorem 3.5]
and the fact that f is bounded and continuous. Therefore, the transition probability p( · |x,a,µ)
is weakly continuous. Thus, Assumption 3.1-(b) holds. Note that Assumption 3.1-(f) holds if the
initial distribution µ0 has a finite second moment. Assumption 3.1-(a) trivially holds since d is
bounded and continuous. Finally, we will verify Assumption 3.1-(c). Suppose (xn, µn)→ (x,µ).
Then, we have r(dy|xn, µn) = q
(
y−H(xn, µn)
)
m(dy) and r(dy|x,µ) = q(y−H(x,µ))m(dy). Since
q
(
y−H(xn, µn)
)→ q(y−H(x,µ)) as n→∞ for all y ∈Y, by Scheffe´’s theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley
[5, Theorem 16.12]) we have r( · |xn, µn)→ r( · |xn, µn) as n→∞ in total variation norm. Thus,
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Assumption 3.1-(c) holds. Therefore, under (i)-(v), there exists a mean-field equilibrium for the
mean-field game of this example.
For the same model, Assumption 2-(a),(c) holds under the following conditions: (vi) d(x,a, y) is
(uniformly) Lipschitz in y with Lipschitz constant Kd, (vii) f(x,a, y) is (uniformly) Lipschitz in y
with Lipschitz constant Kf , (viii) g is bounded and inf(x,a)∈X×A |g(x,a)|=: θ > 0, and (ix) H is only
a function of x.
Indeed, we have
ωc(r) = sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
d(x,a, y)µ(dy)−
∫
X
d(x,a, y)ν(dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
LddBL(µ,ν)
≤Ldr,
where Ld :=max{‖d‖,Kd}. Hence, ωc(r)→ 0 as r→ 0. For ωp, we have
ωp(r) = sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
‖p( · |x,a,µ)− p( · |x,a, ν)‖TV
= sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
sup
‖l‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
l
(
F (x,a,µ)+ g(x,a)z
)
q(z)m(dz)
−
∫
X
l(F (x,a, ν)+ g(x,a)z)q(z)m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
sup
‖l‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
l
(
g(x,a)z
)
q
(
z− F (x,a,µ)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
−
∫
X
l
(
g(x,a)z
)
q
(
z− F (x,a, ν)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
sup
‖h‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
h(z)q
(
z− F (x,a,µ)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
−
∫
X
h(z)q
(
z− F (x,a, ν)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣. (6.1)
For any compact interval K = [−k, k]⊂ X, we can upper bound (6.1) as follows:
(6.1)≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
sup
‖h‖≤1
(∣∣∣∣
∫
K
h(z)q
(
z− F (x,a,µ)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)−
∫
K
h(z)q
(
z− F (x,a, ν)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
+
∫
Kc
q
(
z− F (x,a,µ)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)+
∫
Kc
q
(
z− F (x,a, ν)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
)
. (6.2)
The last two integrals in the last expression go to zero (uniformly in (x,a,µ, ν)) as k→∞, since F
and g are bounded, and inf(x,a)∈X×A |g(x,a)|> 0. For any ε > 0, let Kε = [−kε, kε]⊂ X so that the
sum of these integrals is less than ε for all (x,a,µ, ν). Let Tε denote the Lipschitz seminorm of q
on Kε. Then, we have
(6.2)≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
sup
‖h‖≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
Kε
h(z)q
(
z− F (x,a,µ)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)−
∫
Kε
h(z)q
(
z− F (x,a, ν)
g(x,a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣+ ε
≤ Tε sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
sup
‖h‖≤1
∫
Kε
|h(z)|
∣∣∣∣F (x,a,µ)g(x,a) −
F (x,a, ν)
g(x,a)
∣∣∣∣m(dz)+ ε
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≤ Tε
θ
m(Kε) sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
|F (x,a,µ)−F (x,a, ν)|+ ε
≤ Tε
θ
m(Kε) sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
LfdBL(µ,ν)+ ε
≤ Tε
θ
m(Kε)Lfr+ ε,
where Lf :=max{‖f‖,Kf}. Since ε is arbitrary, we have ωp(r)→ 0 as r→ 0. Thus, Assumption 5.1-
(a) holds. Note that Assumption 5.1-(c) automatically holds as H is only a function of x.
To establish Assumption 5.1-(b), we can impose the following additional assumption, as we did
in Remark 5.2. Suppose µ is the measure-flow in mean-field equilibrium.
(b’) For µ∈ Ξ, there a exists unique minimizer az ∈A of
Cνt (z, · )+β
∫
Z
Jµ∗,t+1(z
′)ηνt (dz
′|z, · ),
for each z ∈ Z and for all t≥ 0.
Under assumption (b’), one can prove that Assumption 5.1-(b) holds. Note that, by Remark 5.2,
assumption (b’) is true if, for instance, d(x,a, y) and ̺(x′|x,a,µ) are strictly convex in a, where ̺
is given by
̺(x′|x,a,µ) = q
(
x′−F (x,a,µ)
g(x,a)
)
1
g(x,a)
.
7. Conclusion This paper has considered discrete-time partially observed mean-field games
subject to infinite-horizon discounted cost, for Polish state, observation, and action spaces. Under
mild conditions, the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been established for this game model using
the conversion of partially observed Markov decision processes to fully observed Markov decision
processes in the belief space and then using the dynamic programming principle. We have also
established that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when used by each agent, constitutes a nearly
Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents.
One interesting future direction of research to pursue is to study partially observed team problems
of the mean-field type. In this case, one possible approach is to establish the global optimality
of person-by-person optimal policies under some convexity assumptions and then use the results
developed in this paper. Finally, partially observed mean-field games with average-cost and risk-
sensitive optimality criteria are also worth studying. In particular, using the vanishing discount
factor approach in MDP theory (i.e., with discount factor β→ 1), it might be possible to establish
similar results for the average cost case.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 4.3 Fix any (z, a) ∈ Z×A and t≥ 0. To ease the notation, let us
write µ(n) :=µν
(n)
and µ :=µν . First note that, for all t≥ 0, µ(n)t weakly converges to µt as n→∞.
We will mimic the proof technique used in Feinberg et al. [18, Section 5] to prove the result. To
this end, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. Fix any (z, a)∈ Z×A. Then, for any f ∈Cb(X), we have
lim
n→∞
sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
C
F
(n)
t (z, a, y)(f) H
(n)
t (dy|z, a)−
∫
C
Ft(z, a, y)(f) Ht(dy|z, a)
∣∣∣∣=0.
In particular, if f ≡ 1, then the above result implies that H(n)t ( · |z, a) converges to Ht( · |z, a) in
total variation norm.
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Proof. We have
sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
C
F
(n)
t (z, a, y)(f) H
(n)
t (dy|z, a)−
∫
C
Ft(z, a, y)(f) Ht(dy|z, a)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
f(x)1C(y)r(dy|x,µ(n)t+1)p(dx|x′, a,µ(n)t )z(dx′)
−
∫
f(x)1C(y)r(dy|x,µt+1)p(dx|x′, a,µt)z(dx′)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
f(x)1C(y)r(dy|x,µ(n)t+1)p(dx|x′, a,µ(n)t )z(dx′)
−
∫
f(x)1C(y)r(dy|x,µt+1)p(dx|x′, a,µ(n)t )z(dx′)
∣∣∣∣
+ sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
f(x)1C(y)r(dy|x,µt+1)p(dx|x′, a,µ(n)t )z(dx′)
−
∫
f(x)1C(y)r(dy|x,µt+1)p(dx|x′, a,µt)z(dx′)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
‖f‖‖r( · |x,µ(n)t+1)− r( · |x,µt+1)‖TV p(dx|x′, a,µ(n)t )z(dx′)
+
∫
sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
f(x)r(C|x,µt+1)p(dx|x′, a,µ(n)t )−
∫
f(x)r(C|x,µt+1)p(dx|x′, a,µt)
∣∣∣∣z(dx′).
The first term in the last expression converges to zero as n→∞ by Langen [31, Theorem 3.5]
since p( · |x′, a,µ(n)t ) weakly converges to p(dx|x′, a,µt) and ‖r( · |x,µ(n)t+1)− r( · |x,µt+1)‖ converges
continuously to 0. For the second term, define F := {f( · )r(C| · , µt+1) :C ∈B(Y)}. Observe that F
is an equicontinuous family of functions. Indeed, let xn→ x in X. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
sup
C∈B(Y)
|f(xn)r(C|xn, µt+1)− f(x)r(C|x,µt+1)|
≤ lim
n→∞
(
sup
C∈B(Y)
|f(xn)r(C|xn, µt+1)− f(xn)r(C|x,µt+1)|
+ sup
C∈B(Y)
|f(xn)r(C|x,µt+1)− f(x)r(C|x,µt+1)|
)
≤ lim
n→∞
(|f(xn)|‖r( · |xn, µt+1)− r( · |x,µt+1)‖TV + |f(xn)− f(x)|)= 0.
Since F is also uniformly bounded, the second term in the last expression also goes to zero as
n→∞ since p( · |x′, a,µ(n)t ) weakly converges to p( · |x′, a,µt). 
Let {fk} ⊂ Cb(X) be the weak convergence determining class of functions in Cb(X); that is, µn
weakly converges to µ in P(X) if and only if limn→∞ µn(fk) = µ(fk) for all k.
Now, we prove that for any subsequence {F (nl)t (z, a, y)}l≥1 of {F (n)t (z, a, y)}n≥1, there exists a
further subsequence {F (nlm)t (z, a, y)}m≥1 such that F (nlm)t (z, a, y) weakly converges to Ft(z, a, y) for
Ht( · |z, a)-almost everywhere. Let us write the subsequence {F (nl)t (z, a, y)}l≥1 as {F (l,0)t (z, a, y)}l≥1.
Since, by Lemma 7.1
lim
l→∞
sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
C
F
(l,0)
t (z, a, y)(f1) H
(l,0)
t (dy|z, a)−
∫
C
Ft(z, a, y)(f1) Ht(dy|z, a)
∣∣∣∣= 0,
F
(l,0)
t (z, a, y)(f1) converges in probability Ht( · |z, a) to Ft(z, a, y)(f1) by Feinberg et al. [18, The-
orem 5.2], and so, there is a subsequence {F (l,1)t (z, a, y)(f1)} of {F (l,0)t (z, a, y)(f1)} such that
F
(l,1)
t (z, a, y)(f1) converges to Ft(z, a, y)(f1) Ht( · |z, a)-almost everywhere. Similarly, by Lemma 7.1
lim
l→∞
sup
C∈B(Y)
∣∣∣∣
∫
C
F
(l,1)
t (z, a, y)(f2) H
(l,1)
t (dy|z, a)−
∫
C
Ft(z, a, y)(f2)Ht(dy|z, a)
∣∣∣∣= 0,
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and so, F
(l,1)
t (z, a, y)(f2) converges in Ht( · |z, a)-probability to Ft(z, a, y)(f2) by Feinberg et al.
[18, Theorem 5.2]. Therefore, there is a subsequence {F (l,2)t (z, a, y)(f2)} of {F (l,1)t (z, a, y)(f2)} such
that F
(l,2)
t (z, a, y)(f2) converges to Ft(z, a, y)(f2) Ht( · |z, a)-almost everywhere. Continuing in this
manner, we obtain an array of sequences. Then, by Cantor’s diagonal argument, for all k ≥ 1,
F
(m,m)
t (z, a, y)(fk) converges to Ft(z, a, y)(fk)Ht( · |z, a)-almost everywhere asm→∞. This implies
that F
(m,m)
t (z, a, y) weakly converges to Ft(z, a, y) Ht( · |z, a)-almost everywhere.
Now, we combine this result and convergence of H
(n)
t ( · |z, a) to Ht( · |z, a) in total varia-
tion norm to complete the proof. By the portmanteau theorem, it is sufficient to prove that
lim infn→∞ η
(n)
t (D|z, a)≥ ηt(D|z, a) for all D open in Z. Suppose to the contrary that there exists
an open set D⊂ Z such that lim infn→∞ η(n)t (D|z, a)< ηt(D|z, a). Then, there exists a subsequence
{η(nk)t (D|z, a)} of {η(n)t (D|z, a)} such that η(nk)t (D|z, a)≤ ηt(D|z, a)−ε for all k. By the above, there
exists a subsequence {F (nkl )t (D|z, a)} of {F (nk)t (D|z, a)} such that F
(nkl
)
t (z, a, y) weakly converges
to Ft(z, a, y) Ht( · |z, a)-almost everywhere. Since D is open, we have
lim inf
l→∞
1{
F
(nkl
)
t (z,a,y)∈D
}≥ 1{
Ft(z,a,y)∈D
}, Ht( · |z, a)-a.e.
Then by Feinberg et al. [18, Lemma 5.1(i)] and the fact that H
(nkl
)
t ( · |z, a) converges to Ht( · |z, a)
in total variation norm, we have
lim inf
l→∞
η
(nkl
)
t (D|z, a) = lim inf
l→∞
∫
Y
1{
F
(nkl
)
t (z,a,y)∈D
}H(nkl )t (dy|z, a)
≥
∫
Y
lim inf
l→∞
1{
F
(nkl
)
t (z,a,y)∈D
}Ht(dy|z, a)
≥
∫
Y
1{
Ft(z,a,y)∈D
}Ht(dy|z, a) = ηt(D|z, a),
which is a contradiction. Hence, we must have lim infn→∞ η
(n)
t (D|z, a)≥ ηt(D|z, a) for all D open
in Z.
B. Proof of Proposition 5.1 Fix any N ≥ 1 and pi(N) ∈Π(N). For each t≥ 0, let Pˆt denote
the probability law of the states sN (t) = (sN1 (t), . . . , s
N
N(t)) and the actions a
N(t) = (aN1 (t), . . . , a
N
N(t))
under pi(N) in the new game model. Similarly, let Pt denote the probability law of the states
xN(t) = (xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N(t)), the observations y
N (k) = (yN1 (k), . . . , y
N
N (k)) for k = 0, . . . , t, and the
actions aN(t) = (aN1 (t), . . . , a
N
N(t)) under pi
(N) in the original finite agent game model. We prove
that, for each t≥ 0,
Pˆt = Pt,
which implies that JˆNi (pi
(N)) = JNi (pi
(N)) for all i=1, . . . ,N .
The claim trivially holds for t = 0. Suppose that the claim holds for t and consider t+ 1. For
t+1, let
At+1 =A
1
t+1× . . .×ANt+1, Ait+1 ∈B(X) for i=1, . . . ,N,
Bk =B
1
k × . . .×BNk , Bik ∈ B(Y) for i=1, . . . ,Nand k= 0, . . . , t+1,
Dt+1 =D
1
t+1× . . .×DNt+1, Dit+1 ∈B(A) for i= 1, . . . ,N.
Define the following transition probability Qt on
∏N
i=1 St+1 given
∏N
i=1 St×
∏N
i=1A as:
Qt(ds
′|s,a) :=
N∏
i=1
Pt(ds
′
i|si, ai, FN(s)),
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where FN(s) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 δsi . Define also Gt+1 :=At+1×Bt+1× . . .B0×Dt+1, Lt :=Bt× . . .B0, and
Ut+1 :=At+1×Bt+1×Dt+1. Then, we have
Pˆt(Gt+1)
=
∫
(St)t×At
∫
Gt+1
( N∏
i=1
πit+1(da
N
i (t+1)|sNi (t+1))
)
Qt(ds
N(t+1)|sN(t),aN(t))Pˆt(dsN(t), daN(t))
=
∫
(St)t×At
∫
Gt+1
N∏
i=1
(
πit+1(da
N
i (t+1)|sNi (t+1))
r(dyNi (t+1)|xNi (t+1))p(dxNi (t+1)|xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t )
t∏
k=0
δyN
i
(k)(dy
N
i (k))
)
Pt(dx
N(t), dyN(t : 0), daN(t))
=
∫
Xt×At×Lt
∫
Ut+1
N∏
i=1
(
πit+1(da
N
i (t+1)|sNi (t+1))
r(dyNi (t+1)|xNi (t+1))p(dxNi (t+1)|xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t )
)
Pt(dx
N(t), dyN(t : 0), daN(t))
= Pt+1(Gt+1),
where dyN (k : 0) := (dyN(k), . . . , dyN (0)). Hence, Pˆt+1 = Pt+1. This implies that Jˆ
N
i (pi
(N)) =
JNi (pi
(N)) for all i= 1, . . . ,N .
The second part of the proposition can be proved similarly, so we omit the details.
C. Proof of Lemma 5.1 The claim trivially holds for t= 0. Suppose that the claim holds for
t and consider t+1. For t+1, let Gt+1 =At+1 ×Bt+1× . . .B0, where At+1 ∈ B(X) and Bk ∈ B(Y)
for k= 0, . . . , t+1. Define also Lt :=Bt× . . .B0, and Ut+1 :=At+1×Bt+1. Then, we have∫
S×A
Pt(Gt+1|s(t), a(t),∆t)πt(da(t)|s(t))∆t(ds(t))
=
∫
S×A
∫
Gt+1
r(dy(t+1)|x(t+1))p(dx(t+1)|x(t), a(t),∆t,1)
t∏
k=0
δy(k)(dy(k))πt(da(t)|s(t))∆t(ds(t))
=
∫
X×A×Lt
∫
Ut+1
r(dy(t+1)|x(t+1))p(dx(t+1)|x(t), a(t),∆t,1)πt(da(t)|s(t))∆t(ds(t))
=∆t(Gt+1).
Since, Gt+1 is arbitrary, this completes the proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 5.5 Fix any sequence {TN}N≥1 satisfying the hypothesis of the
proposition. Fix any t≥ 0 and suppose that
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(s˜N1 (t))(gN)−L(sˆN(t))(gN)∣∣= 0 (7.1)
for any bounded sequence {gN}N≥1 ⊂Cb(St). Given (7.1), we prove that
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN)−L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(TN)∣∣= 0. (7.2)
Indeed, we have∣∣L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN)−L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(TN)∣∣
Saldi, Bas¸ar, and Raginsky: Partially Observed Stochastic Games with Mean-Field Interactions
Mathematics of Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 31
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
St×P(St)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(ds, d∆)−
∫
St×P(St)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
St×P(St)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)−
∫
St×P(St)
TN (s,∆)L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣. (7.3)
First, note that since {TN( · ,∆t)}N≥1⊂Cb(St), we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
St
TN(s,∆t)L(s˜N1 (t))(ds)−
∫
St
TN(s,∆t)L(sˆN(t))(ds)
∣∣∣∣= 0
by (7.1).
Now, let us consider the first term in (7.3). To that end, define F := {TN(s, · ) : s ∈ St,N ≥ 1)}.
Note that F is a uniformly bounded and equicontinuous family of functions on P(St), and therefore
lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
F∈F
∣∣F (∆˜(N)t )−F (∆t)∣∣
]
= 0
as L(∆˜(N)t )→L(∆t) weakly. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
St×P(St)
TN (s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(ds, d∆)−
∫
St×P(St)
TN (s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
N→∞
∫
St
∣∣∣∣
∫
P(St)
TN (s,∆)L(∆˜(N)t |s˜N1 (t))(d∆|s)−
∫
P(St)
TN (s,∆)L(δ∆t)(d∆)
∣∣∣∣L(s˜N1 (t))(ds)
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
E
[∣∣TN (s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )−TN(s˜N1 (t),∆t)∣∣
∣∣∣∣s˜N1 (t)
]]
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
F∈F
∣∣F (∆˜(N)t )−F (∆t)∣∣
]
= 0.
Hence, (7.1) implies (7.2) for any t.
Now, we prove that (7.1) is true for all t, which will complete the proof as (7.1) implies (7.2).
Set supN≥1 ‖gN‖=:L<∞ and define
lN,t(s,∆) :=
∫
A×St+1
gN(s
′)Pt(ds
′|s, a,∆)π˜(N)t (da|s).
For any s ∈ St and (∆,∆′)∈P(St)2, we have
|lN,t(s,∆)− lN,t(s,∆′)|
≤L sup
(s,a)∈St×A
‖Pt( · |s, a,∆)−Pt( · |s, a,∆′)‖TV
≤LωPt(dt(∆,∆′)).
Since ωPt(r)→ 0 as r→ 0 by (III), the family {lN,t(s, · ) : s∈ St,N ≥ 1} is equicontinuous.
We prove (7.1) by induction on t. The claim trivially holds for t= 0 as L(s˜N1 (0)) =L(sˆN(0)) = λ0
for all N ≥ 1. Suppose the claim holds for t and consider t+1. We can write∣∣L(s˜N1 (t+1))(gN)−L(sˆN(t+1))(gN)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
St×P(St)
lN,t(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(ds, d∆)−
∫
St×P(St)
lN,t(s,∆)L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣.
Since the family {lN,t}N≥1 is equicontinuous and bounded, and (7.1) implies (7.2) at time t, the
last term converges to zero as N →∞. This completes the proof.
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